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Abstract
We analyze the process of immigrant selection and occupational outcomes of Inter-
national Medical Graduates (IMGs) in the US and Canada. We extend the IMG
relicensing model of Kugler and Sauer (2005) to incorporate two dierent approaches
to immigrant selection: employer nomination systems and point systems. Analysis of
the model indicates that point systems can allow IMGs to immigrate who would be
unable to gain entry to the receiving country under an employer nomination system
and who are subsequently unable to relicense and work as physicians in the receiving
country. We apply the model to the case of IMGs migrating to the US and Canada
since the 1960s and evaluate the empirical predictions from the model based on an
analysis of the occupational outcomes of IMGs in Canada (where a point system has
been in place) and in the US (where IMGs enter through employer nomination). In
Canada, IMGs are less likely to be employed as a physician than are IMGs in the US
and a large percentage of the IMGs in Canada either nd work in lower skill occupa-
tions or are not employed. The empirical ndings are consistent with our hypotheses
based on the theoretical framework on the eects of immigrant selection systems on
the probability of working as a physician in the two countries.
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In major immigrant-receiving countries such as Canada and the US, immigration policy is an
important determinant of the supply of workers to dierent occupations. The labour market
performance of immigrants in both of these countries has received considerable attention
in the economics literature due to concern that more recent cohorts have received lower
earnings than did immigrants of earlier arrival cohorts (for the US see, Chiswick (1978),
Borjas (1995), Card (2005), and Smith (2006); for Canada, see Baker and Benjamin (1994),
and Aydemir and Skuterud (2005)). While the experiences and immigration policies of both
countries have diered in a number of ways, a shared experience of dramatic changes in source
country composition since the 1960s has led to signicant public policy challenges in terms
of integrating new immigrants with very dierent linguistic and educational backgrounds
into the receiving country labour markets. These challenges are especially great when the
desired occupations of the potential immigrants are regulated by professional bodies which
restrict access to the profession. At the same time, the nature of a country's immigrant
selection process determines whether a foreign trained individual is even able to gain access
to the receiving country. In this way, immigrant selection policies and professional credential
recognition policies act as a double hurdle that potential immigrants must clear before they
are able to work in their intended occupations in the receiving country.
The medical profession is an important example of an occupation in which signicant
hurdles must be overcome before an immigrant with an international medical degree is able
to work as a physician. In both Canada and the US, international medical graduates (IMGs)
must go through a process of examinations, medical residencies in Canadian or US hospitals,
and licensing procedures before they are able to practice medicine. Faced with these costs,
these immigrants may instead choose, or be forced, to accept employment in alternative oc-
cupations. If the IMG nds work in another higher skill occupation then their post migration
economic outcomes may be relatively good and the decision to admit the person into the
receiving country could be thought of as successful since the person's human capital would
have a good return in the new labour market (even if s/he is not working as a physician).
1However, if the IMG instead is only able to nd employment in a lower skill occupation (or
is unable to nd employment) then this constitutes a poor outcome in terms of the immi-
grant selection policy for the receiving country and a loss of signicant human capital for
the sending country.1
While the certication processes for IMGs are similar in Canada and the US, the two
countries' immigration policies dier considerably. Immigration of skilled individuals without
family ties to US citizens has been dominated by employer nomination of skilled immigrants
(and temporary migrants who eventually gain permanent resident status). The employer
nomination immigration route is likely to be a high hurdle for potential immigrants to pass
since employers may be reluctant to go to the time and expense of oering employment to
a candidate if s/he lacks the training or language skills needed to complete relicensing in
order to work as a physician in the US. Canadian immigration policy since 1967 has diered
from the US system in terms of the primary method of selection of skilled immigrants. While
employer nomination in Canada is possible, it is a small part of the ow of skilled immigrants
into Canada.2 Instead, Canada has relied on a point system to allocate relatively scarce spots
in the Skilled Worker and Professionals category to the long queue of potential applicants.
The points are an index of the characteristics that are associated with immigrants who are
expected to be successful in the Canadian economy based on objective criteria at the time
of application such as education, occupation and language uency. However, the Canadian
point system has at times included occupational restrictions that have eectively excluded
IMGs who were not being nominated by an employer from entering as skilled principal
applicants.
We exploit this policy variation both between Canada and the United States and across
time in Canada to address two main questions. First, is a point system as eective as an
1The issue of the ethical and economic implications of the recruitment of medical degree holders from
developing countries is an important research topic. However, we are considering this issue only from the
perspective of the receiving country.
2For example, Houle and Yssaad (2010) report that in a sample of immigrants who applied for immigration
from outside of Canada between October 1, 2000, and September 30, 2001 and were age 18 to 59 at landing,
only seven percent had pre-arranged employment. Using the same data, Imai, Stacey, and Warman (2011)
nd that immigrants who had pre-arranged employment obtained much better occupational matches.
2employer nomination system in terms of controlling the intake of immigrants wishing to
work in the medical profession? Second, can occupational restrictions within a point system
structure control the intake of IMGs as well as an employer nomination system? These are
key questions for immigration policy with regard to regulated professions given the prevalence
of point systems around the world (Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) and
the fact that new ones have been proposed but ultimately not implemented in the US (in
2007) and even more recently proposed for Germany (see Hinte, Rinne, and Zimmermann
(2011)).
2 Relicensing Procedures for International Medical Grad-
uates in the US and Canada
Lesky (2011) reviews processes required for foreign-trained medical professionals to work as
physicians in both Canada and the United States (see also McMahon (2004), for the US and
Boyd and Schellenberg (2007), for Canada). In both countries, medical education entails
a four year graduate program. In order to be eligible for licensure and board certication,
the individual must also complete a period of residency training lasting two to ten years
which constitutes graduate medical education (GME). In both countries, medical degrees
and GME acquired in the other country are generally accepted as equivalent to domestic
medical degrees and GME. Consequently, in each country, an IMG is dened to be a person
who completed his/her medical training outside of either the US or Canada (see Whelan
et al. (2002)). This is indicative of the high degree of comparability and integration of
medical education and certication across these two countries. Lesky (2011) concludes that
similar educational and examination requirements exist in Canada and the US in order for
an IMG to enter GME.
33 Immigration Policy Dierences between Canada and
the US
A number of authors have compared the labour market outcomes of immigrants in Canada
relative to those in the US to see whether the existence of the point system in Canada
leads to a more highly skilled steam of new immigrants landing in Canada relative to the
US. Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003) use Census data for Australia (where a point
system was also in place), Canada and the US using Census data for 1990/1991. They
do nd a skill decit for US immigrants relative to immigrants landing in either Australia
or Canada but this decit disappears after they exclude immigrants from Latin America.
They conclude that the comparatively low skill level of US immigrants has more to do
with geographic and historical ties to Mexico than with the skill-based immigrant selection
systems in place in Australia and Canada. In his analysis of labour market outcomes of
immigrants in Canada and the US, Borjas (1991) nds that the point system changes the
national origin mix of the incoming immigrants in Canada relative to what it would be in
the absence of this skilled immigration program. However, the point system is not found
to change the average characteristics of immigrants coming from a given country. Beach,
Green, and Worswick (2007) focus on the eectiveness of the Canadian point system (without
benchmarking against the US experience). They analyze the characteristics at landing of
immigrants in Canada using administrative data and nd that changes in the weights placed
on dierent characteristics under the point system grid did have a signicant impact on
the average characteristics of the subsequent entry cohorts, with the impact on changes in
points for education being especially responsive. An earlier study by Green and Green (1995)
also analyzed the eectiveness of the Canadian point system and concluded that the points
system criteria did have an impact on the occupational composition but that its degree of
eectiveness was limited by the large number of dierent criteria used in calculating the total
point value for the applicant.
In contrast to previous studies, our analysis focuses on a single occupation, physicians.
4Consequently, the relevant question is not whether the Canadian point system leads to more
educated immigrant inows relative to the US, but whether the policy dierences with regard
to the admission of IMGs between Canada and the US lead to dierent probabilities of the
IMGs working in the receiving economy as a physician. In addition, in cases where the IMG
does not work as a physician, we are interested in understanding whether the IMGs are
likely to work in higher skill versus lower skill occupations (or not work at all) and how these
probabilities are aected by the way in which admission was determined.
Lesky (2011) compares the processes for selecting IMGs for entry into Canada and the
US. She notes that in Canada, an IMG must be a permanent resident or Canadian citizen
in order to apply for a GME position. In contrast, foreign-born IMGs wishing to enter a US
residency program may be citizens, permanent residents or have an appropriate temporary
visa. She notes that the H1-B temporary-professional-worker visa and the J-1 exchange-
visitor visa are the only options for most IMGs. Both visas require an employer sponsor
.3 In terms of Canadian immigration policy towards IMGs, Lesky (2011) notes that IMGs
can gain permanent resident status through the point system of the Skilled Workers and
Professionals program of immigration which does not require pre-arranged employment.
It is important to note that the nature of the Canadian point system has varied in
important ways over time and this has had an impact on its receptiveness to IMGs as
potential immigrants. Over the relevant period for our analysis (1976 through 2006), we
see three dierent regimes in terms of whether an IMG without pre-arranged employment
was able to enter Canada as a landed immigrant through the point system.4 The rst
regime (1976-85) can be thought of as a point system which either required pre-arranged
3Mullan, Politzer, and David (1995) nd that the majority of IMGs who participate in GME in the United
States ultimately enter US practices.
4We report estimates for the pre 1976 cohorts; however, we have concerns regarding the representativeness
of the samples given the fact that our data are taken from the 2006 Canadian Census, several decades after
the arrival of the pre-1976 immigrants. In addition, a period of openness to physicians occurred between
1971 and 1975 when physicians were on the preferred list of occupations for the point system. However, this
policy change in 1971 was made due to a perceived shortage of physicians and then physicians were removed
from the occupation list in 1975 once the number of physicians who had entered was deemed to be sucient
to meet the demand. Consequently, we see these two policy changes as endogenous and we expect that the
occupational outcomes of IMGs who entered under this regime are likely to have been biased towards more
positive outcomes in consequence.
5employment (1981-85) or had an occupational restriction against physicians unless they had
pre-arranged employment (1976-81).5 The second regime (1986-2001) can be thought of as
a point system with occupational restrictions but where two changes in policy may have
limited their eectiveness. First, the size of the immigrant intake was expanding (especially
for the economic class) and new avenues to permanency were opening up for prospective
immigrants with high levels of education. In addition, the importance of occupational criteria
relative to educational criteria was dropping (especially after 1993) making it relatively easier
for IMGs to enter if they could convince the visa ocer that working as a physician was
not their intended occupation. The third regime coincided with the coming into eect of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2002 which removed occupational
targeting from the point system and focused instead on perceived human capital of the
applicant. Under this regime it was relatively easy for an IMG to gain admission under
the federal point system even if their foreign medical degree was unlikely to be recognized
and even if their uency in either English or French was likely to be a signicant barrier to
working as a physician in Canada.6
The rst regime most resembles the US employer nomination system in place over the
period in that it was not possible in principle to be admitted as an IMG under the point
system without pre-arranged employment. In contrast, the third regime least resembles
the US employer nomination system since the introduction of IRPA made admission clearly
about perceived human capital, making it relatively easy for IMGs to enter regardless of
the challenges they would face in terms of working as a physician. The second regime
falls somewhere in between the rst and third regimes in terms of its comparability to the
US employer nomination system. One key feature of Canadian immigration policy over
this period was a large expansion of the total inow beginning in 1987. In 1985, 84,345
immigrants landed in Canada but by 1988 that number had nearly doubled to 161,584 and
5Between 1982 and 1985, the economic stream of immigrants to Canada was basically shut down for
immigrants who did not have pre-arranged employment in response to the weak labour market conditions
at the time (Green and Green (1995)).
6This historical material is based on Dumont et al. (2008), Green and Green (1995) and McWhinney
(1998).
6over the period 1989 through 2001, the total intake was above 200,000 in virtually every year
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2011)). As part of this expansion of the Canadian
immigration program, the share entering through the economic class as a whole (of which
the point system is a subset) grew considerably from 36% in 1986 to 45.2% in 1990 then
to 55.5% in 1996. It may be that these changes to the level of immigrants entering under
the economic categories made it easier for IMGs to enter Canada either through the point
system (possibly by misrepresenting their intended occupation) or through other parts of
the economic admission categories - possibilities we consider below.
Dumont et al. (2008) note that while physicians were excluded from entry though the
point system between 1986 and 2001, some physicians may have found entry by applying as
either entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals or under the investor category, three alterna-
tive streams of skilled worker ows that did not face the same occupational restrictions. In
fact, the investor category was introduce on January 1, 1986, and would have been a rela-
tively easy way for a highly educated IMG with enough nancial resources to enter Canada
as a landed immigrant given that the intake of economic immigrants was greatly expanded
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Finally, Parent and Worswick (2004) note that immigrant selection for those intending
to land in the mostly French speaking province of Canada was very similar to the federal
immigrant selection policy between 1978 (when the Quebec government's involvement in im-
migrant selection began) until 1996 with the introduction of the \employabilit e et mobilit e"
program which stressed broad skills that made potential immigrants relatively exible and
able to take on jobs in dierent occupations even if their main intended occupation did not
correspond to one of the \occupations in demand". This could be thought of as a pre-cursor
to the introduction of IRPA in 2002 and would have made it easier for IMGs intending to
land in Quebec to gain landed immigrant status. In this way the Quebec point grid cor-
responded more closely to our theoretical model of a points system without occupational
restrictions compared to our model of a points system with occupational restrictions.
Taking these policy changes in the 1986 through 1996 period together, we see a pattern
7of deterioration in the occupational restrictions (or at least their eectiveness) over the 1986-
2001 period in Canada. In each case, the route that IMGs took to gain permanent residency
status in Canada would not have been available under a pure employer nomination system.
In summary, our two sources of policy variation are: 1) US/Canada dierences related
to the use of employer nomination versus a point system in the selection of IMGs and
2) variation through time in the use of occupational restrictions in the implementation of
the point system in Canada. We argue that these policy dierences can be treated as
exogenous policy variation for the purposes of our analysis for the following reasons. The
decision to use a point system rather than employer nomination as the principal way of
attracting skilled immigrant to Canada compared with the US is driven by philosophical
dierences between the two countries related to the roles of government and the private
sector. Specically, the Canadian approach has been to trust government ocials to select
skilled immigrants, whereas the US approach has been to trust employers to be able to
identify the best skilled immigrants. We do not feel that these dierent approaches to
immigrant selection are endogenous in the sense of being related to any other unobserved
factors that would aect the economic outcomes of IMGs after arrival in the receiving country
(except with regard to the direct impact of having a pre-arranged spot in relicensing program
for immigrants admitted under an employer nomination program). In terms of the variation
across time in the use of occupational restrictions in the Canadian point system, we believe
that each of the three post 1976 regimes should be considered as an exogenous policy change
at least with regard to the impact it had on the labour market outcomes of IMGs. None
of these policy changes were targeted explicitly at physicians but rather were changes in
the extent to which occupational restrictions were imposed on various immigrant selection
categories.
84 Previous Research on the Economic Outcomes of
IMGs
Given the substantial reliance on IMGs in the medical systems of both the US and Canada,
there has been interest among researchers in the employment outcomes and geographic dis-
tribution of these groups. Using data from the 2001 Canadian census, Boyd and Schellenberg
(2007) analyze the incidence of IMGs not being employed as physicians and nd that the
country of birth of the IMG is the most important determinant of the probability of nding
employment as a doctor. A signicant body of US literature exists on physicians' remu-
neration (see, for example, Bashaw and Heywood (2001)). However, there appears to be
relatively little research explicitly on the labour market outcomes of foreign-born physicians
in the United States.7 Instead, the focus of the US literature has been on their importance
as part of the US health provision systems. For example, McMahon (2004) nds that inter-
national medical graduates account for one-quarter of the physicians in the United States.
An important recent study by Kugler and Sauer (2005) analyzes the relicensing decisions
of immigrant medical degree holders in Israel. Using data on IMGs from the former Soviet
Union, they take advantage of the fact that the IMGs arriving in Israel between 1989 and
1993 were assigned to one of two dierent relicensing tracks depending on past experience.
They use this assignment as an instrument in order to separately identify the returns to
relicensing as well as the selection into relicensing since a signicant fraction of the IMGs
chose not to relicense after they arrived in Israel. The authors develop a model of the decision
to relicense for these immigrants and show that it is possible for there to be both positive
and negative selection into relicensing.8 In the former case, the higher skilled IMGs enter
7An exception is a recent study by McDonald, Warman, and Worswick (2011) which employed data from
the 2000 US Census and the 2001 Canadian Census to analyze the earnings and school enrolment decisions
of immigrants employed as physicians in each country. A limitation of their analysis relates to the fact that
the US Census does not allow for the identication of medical degree holders unless they are working as
physicians. As well, prior to the 2006 Canadian Census, country of education was not reported directly and
had to be imputed based on age at arrival Canada.
8See also Duleep and Regets (1999) for a two period model of post migration human capital investment
for immigrants to the US.
9relicensing while the lower skilled work in the unlicensed sector (due to the cost of relicensing
being considered too high given the benets). The fact that the OLS returns are found to
be lower than the returns estimated using an instrumental variables method indicates that
negative selection existed with the higher skilled IMGs choosing against relicensing and
instead entering the unlicensed sector after arrival. While the Kugler and Sauer (2005)
study sheds light on important issues related to the relicensing decision of IMGs, it is less
informative with regard to the eect of immigrant selection systems on these outcomes since
potential immigrants of Jewish descent were free to immigrate to Israel. Consequently, there
was not a point system in place nor was there a requirement that an employer sponsor the
IMG applicants for immigration.
5 Model
In this section, we present the basic framework of the model of occupational re-licensing
based on the model of Kugler and Sauer (2005) then extend it by introducing dierent
immigrant selection systems. We consider the implications for the average skills of entering
immigrants and the likelihood of completing relicensing under two immigrant selection rules:
1) the employer nomination approach used in the US for skilled immigrants (typically via
temporary work visas leading to permanent residency) and 2) a point system based on
a combination of human capital and occupational criteria similar to the one used in the
Canadian immigration selection system.
5.1 Kugler and Sauer Model
There exists a continuum of workers possessing skill type, , where  is drawn from a dis-
tribution F() with support [;]. Individuals have a subjective discount rate, r, and are
assumed to live for two periods. Each individual must decide whether to work in the unli-
censed sector or invest time and out-of-pocket resources into relicensing. It is assumed that
10out-of-pocket costs and psychological costs associated with acquiring a licence are relatively
lower for the more skilled (higher ) individuals, and the opportunity costs are also relatively
higher due to the higher foregone wages. The decision over whether or not to complete re-
licensing in the rst period is based on the costs of relicensing and the wages in both the
licensed and unlicensed sectors in each period. As Kugler and Sauer show, an individual will
choose to acquire a license and work in the licensed occupation in the second period if the
present value of net earnings is higher than would be the case if the individual were to enter
the unlicensed sector in the rst period and works there in both periods.
5.2 IMGs as Potential Immigrants and a Skill Threshold for Re-
licensing
We employ the basic structure of the Kugler and Sauer model and apply it to the case of
a pool of potential immigrants with international medical degrees applying to migrate to a
receiving country such as the US or Canada. The focus of Kugler and Sauer's analysis was
on IMGs who had immigrated to Israel and who already possessed medical degrees from
the former Soviet Union and were entitled to reside permanently in Israel and so did not
need to meet any other selection requirements. In addition, the fact that the IMGs had
completed their medical training in a single country with a good quality of education means
that the degree of skill heterogeneity was likely low. In contrast, the degree of heterogeneity
in the pool of IMGs wishing to migrate to either the US or Canada is much greater with
many dierent possible countries where the medical education was completed and a great
deal of heterogeneity in terms of uency in the ocial language(s) of the receiving country.
Consequently, it is important to account for this high degree of heterogeneity in our model.
For notational simplicity, the distribution of skills is assumed to be the same as in section
5.1 but it applies to all potential immigrants and not just those accepted for immigration.
The skill term, , should be thought of as an aggregate index of: 1) innate ability, 2)
11human capital as valued in the receiving country9 and 3) language uency. This aggregate
skill variable represents the value of the person's time either working as a physician or
participating in the relicensing program in the new country.
Rather than model the selection into or out of relicensing (based in part on the indi-
vidual's skill) as done by Kugler and Sauer, we focus on the probability that an IMG will
be unable to complete a relicensing program.10 We introduce into the model a threshold
parameter, m, which represents the lowest value of  for which relicensing in the receiving
country is possible and assume that part of the skill distribution lies below it,  < m. Given
the high skill and language requirements expected of native born students in medical degree
programs in the US or Canada, it is reasonable to assume that at least some IMGs wishing
to migrate have values of  that fall below this threshold (if for no other reason than a lack
of required language uency).
5.3 IMG Selection through Employer Nomination
In the rst period, we assume that employers can sponsor each applicant with skill level,
, for a temporary visa to allow them to enter the re-licensing program. If the applicant
accepts the position and carries out the relicensing program, they become a permanent
resident and are able to work in the licensed occupation in the second period. The key issue
for our analysis relates to whether IMGs receive visas in the rst period. Assuming that  is
observed by employers, they will make oers of visas to the highest skill applicants available.
The marginal IMG sponsored for a visa by a rm in the rst period will have a skill level
that at least satises e  m since employers would not be willing to hire an applicant
who is unable to complete the relicensing program. However, we assume that the receiving
9We do not distinguish between the quality of the foreign medical training and the transferability of that
training (the case where the skills would be highly valued in the country where they were obtained but they
do not transfer easily to the receiving country's labour market).
10In our empirical analysis, we do account for the possibility of selection into other higher skilled occupa-
tions but abstract from it here since we see this as a relatively good outcome of the immigration of IMGs
since their human capital is being employed in a higher skill job as opposed to being either not employed or
working in a lower skill occupation (other possibilities in our empirical analysis).
12country government places a limit on the total number of visas for this occupation so as to
ensure that there is not a large negative impact on wages for the physicians already working
in the receiving country (or in an attempt to control health care costs). Consequently, not
all applicants will be accepted. The limit on visas translates into a lower bound on the skill
level, e, for international applicants in the relicensing programs for this occupation and we
assume that e > m.
The fraction of IMG applicants sponsored by employers for temporary visas to undergo
the relicensing is: 1   F(e). The expected skill level of IMGs admitted to the licensing
program in the rst period can be expressed as:
e  E(j  e) >  (1)
where  is the unconditional mean of . The employer nomination scheme allows for the
selection of the higher skill individuals and ensures that all of the IMGs who enter the
receiving country both complete relicensing and go on to work as physicians.
5.4 Immigrant Selection under a Human Capital Point System
Instead of IMGs being selected through an employer nomination system, consider the im-
plementation of a point system where selection of skilled economic immigrants in general,
and IMGs in particular, is based on human capital proxy variables such as education, work
experience and language uency. In section 5.3, we argue that the number of visas issued
for relicensing programs under an employer nomination program would be kept suciently
low to ensure that there was not a large inux of IMGs that would drive down salaries or
employment probabilities of physicians. Under a point system, there is much greater latitude
to admit a large number of immigrants within a given occupational grouping so long as there
are no occupational restrictions since the total number of immigrants is the target rather
than the number of immigrants intending to enter each occupation. Under this kind of point
system, individuals with relatively high education levels (such as medical degrees) are very
13likely to be admitted so long as their uency in the language(s) of the receiving country is
suciently high.
We assume that the point system screen excludes part of the lower skill distribution
of IMGs. These would be IMGs whose training and/or language uency is clearly decient
relative to medical training and language skills needed to function successfully as a physician
in the receiving country. To represent this, we assume that there is an implicit minimum
skill threshold, p, for an IMG to be admitted. In addition, we assume that p < m < e.
The rst inequality can be justied by the fact that the skill requirement needed to pass the
points test is a lower skill requirement then that needed to complete a medical relicensing
program since: 1) immigration authorities are typically reluctant to treat foreign educational
credentials as inferior to domestic credentials (certainly the case historically in Canada); and
2) language uency needed to function as a physician is greater than the uency typically
needed to be admitted through a general skilled immigration program. The second inequality
is taken from Section 5.3 and reects the scarcity of employer nomination positions due to
concerns regarding impact on the earnings of physicians. Taken together this implies that the
minimum skill level of an IMG admitted under the point system is lower than the minimum
under an employer nomination system (p < e). This means that the average skill level of
IMGs admitted under the point system are lower than under employer nomination:
p  E(j  p) < e (2)
and the proportion of IMGs admitted under the point system who cannot complete relicens-
ing is higher under the point system than under employer nomination, since F(m) F(p) >
0.
145.5 Immigrant Selection under a Point System with Occupational
Restrictions
A human capital point system can be augmented using information on intended occupation.
One way to do this is to ban applications of individuals unless their intended occupation
is on a preferred list of occupations.11 Another variation on this approach is only to allow
immigrants to be admitted who intend to work in occupations on the preferred list in circum-
stances in which the immigrants have pre-arranged employment by a recognized employer.
Under this implementation of a point system, we would expect the same minimum skill
threshold (e) and the average skills of the IMGs as under an employer nomination system:
0  E(j  e) = e (3)
Also, all IMGs admitted would be able to complete relicensing as is the case under the
employer nomination system of section 5.3.
However, this does assume that the immigration authorities are eective in terms of
limiting entry based on intended occupation. Within a point system, it may be possible
for an IMG to misrepresent their intended occupation and even their education levels since
having a medical degree may be the criterion used by the visa ocer to prevent entry of an
IMG. If it is possible for some but not all of the lower skill IMGs to enter through the point
system with occupational restrictions in this way then equation (3) may not hold.
5.6 Theoretical Predictions Based on Immigrant Selection Sys-
tems of US and Canada since 1975
Based on our analysis of the theoretical model, the rate of IMGs working as physicians should
be the same for those admitted under the US employer nomination system or under a point
11Alternatively, one could build occupational points into the points grid rewarding intended occupations
that are on the preferred list making it dicult or even impossible to be admitted unless the intended
occupation is one in which the government feels that more labour supply from immigrants is needed.
15system with occupational restrictions that bar IMGs without pre-arranged employment, such
as was in place in Canada over the period 1975 to 1986. In the period after January, 2002, a
point system without occupational restrictions was introduced and our theoretical analysis
predicts that IMGs admitted over this period will have higher probabilities of being unable
to relicense since at least some of them will not have the human capital and/or language
skills needed to complete the relicensing process.
Over the intermediate period, 1987 to 2001, the federal Skilled Worker and Professionals
Program had a point system with occupational restrictions and physicians were banned from
consideration over this period unless they had pre-arranged employment. For these IMGs,
the model predicts that they will have the same average skill level and probability of complet-
ing relicensing as the IMGs admitted over the period 1975 through 1986 or those admitted
under the employer nomination system of the US. However, as described in section 3, the
large expansion of immigrants entering under the economic categories as well as reduction
in importance placed on occupation relative to education criteria may have meant that the
occupational restrictions were not fully enforced for all economic applicants. Consequently,
this can be best thought of as a period of transition between a point system with occupa-
tional restrictions (1975 through 1986) and a point system without occupational restrictions
(2002-2006). We will evaluate these theoretical predictions by comparing the occupational
outcomes of IMGs residing in both Canada and the US.
6 The Data and Estimation Sample
The Canadian data used in the estimation are taken from the 2006 Canadian condential
census master le.12 This 20% sample of the Canadian population contains rich personal
information. In particular, detailed information on education is available which allows for
the identication of who has a medical degree, where the degree was obtained, and whether
12We chose not to use earlier census master les for Canada due to the fact that they did not ask for the
location where the respondent's highest education was obtained.
16or not the person is currently working as a physician. In particular, the Canadian Census
allows for the identication of individuals with medical degrees irrespective of whether or
not they are working as physicians. In contrast, the US Census only identies individuals
with medical degrees if they are working as physicians. Fortunately, information equivalent
to that in the Canadian Census is available in the 1993 and 2003 US National Survey of
College Graduates (NSCG).13 Due to the smaller sample sizes of the NSCG data (compared
to the Canadian Census), we pool the samples from 1993 and 2003 in our analysis.14 While
the Canadian and American data sources are dierent, they both contain representative
samples of all individuals with medical degrees living within the respective countries.
The age range in the analysis of both the Canadian and the US data is restricted to 29
to 65. We chose the age of 29 as our minimum age (as opposed to a younger age) so as to
reduce the probability that a person in our sample has not yet completed a medical degree
but would proceed to do so. We restrict both the Canadian sample and the US sample to
include only individuals who have a medical degree (regardless of occupation).15
In Table 1, sample means are presented based on the location where medical training
occurred, separately for Canada and the US. In our Canadian sample, a much lower percent-
age of the medical degree holders reported studying in Canada (70.4% for men and 63.4%
for women) compared with the percentage of medical degree holders in the US who studied
in the US (85.3% for men and 78.9% for women). Medical degree holders trained outside of
Canada are most likely to have been educated in the UK group of countries, Eastern Europe,
Eastern Asia and Southern Asia.16 In the US data, IMGs are most likely to have studied in
Eastern Asia, South Asia and South America. This initial statistical snapshot reveals that
both countries have a signicant percentage of medical degree holders with foreign degrees
13We use the NSCG weights in all of our analysis to allow for generalization of the results to the US
population of medical degree holders meeting the sample selection restrictions. We also make use of weights
in the Canadian Census.
14The sample size in the 1993 data is 5,639 and in the 2003 data is 3,497.
15In the NSCG, we can identify not only the highest degree but also the most recent degree. We present
the results for the most recent degree but nd the results to be identical if we restrict the analysis to the
highest degree.
16See the notes below the tables for denitions of the country groupings.
17but that Canada has a much larger share. This is consistent with the fact that Canada
has a larger immigration program per capita than the US and the fact that education is an
important determinant of skilled immigration under the Canadian point system.
Table 2 contains the US and Canadian distributions of medical degree holders according
to whether they are: 1) working as a physician17, 2) working in some other higher skill
occupation, 3) working in a lower skill occupation, 4) not working. For those who studied in
Canada, 91.2% of men and 88.1% of women are working as a physician and in each case this
is higher than the equivalent statistics in the US data (87.1% for men and 78.1% for women).
In contrast, for medical degree holders trained outside of their current country of residence,
the patterns are dramatically dierent. In the US, the percentage of these IMGs working as
a physician is only 73.5% for men and 54.8% for women, but the dierence is larger still in
Canada where the percentage of medical degree holders who studied outside Canada and who
are working as a physician is only 57.2% for men and 33.0% for women. For both men and
women, the proportion of medical degree holders trained outside of the country of residence
and working in the other higher skill occupation group is higher for both men and women
in Canada than in the US (but the dierence is small for women). When the equivalent
comparison is made for lower skill occupations and for not working we see higher probabilities
of the IMGs in Canada in these occupational categories than for their counterparts in the US.
This is strong preliminary evidence of a much larger problem of nding suitable employment
as either a physician or in some other high skill occupation among IMGs in Canada compared
with the case in the US. It is also consistent with the analysis of our model that a Canadian-
style point system (without strictly enforced occupational restrictions) is more open to the
admission of IMGs who are unlikely to work as physicians (or in other high skill occupations)
relative to a US-style employer nomination system.
In Table 3, we present means by gender for the foreign born and foreign trained sub-
samples of medical degree holders according to whether the person is working as a physician
in Canada. We see large cross country dierences. The UK group of countries has a large
17Throughout our analysis, the term physician is dened to include surgeons and other medical specialists.
18share of those IMGs who are working as physicians (36% for men and 21% for women)
compared to their share of those not working as a physician (1% each for men and women).
In contrast, the share of immigrants from East Asia in the working as a physician category
is relatively small (at 6% for men and 9% for women) compared to their share in the not
working as a physician category (20% for men and 27% for women). Overall, we can say that
the medical degree holders who were trained in traditional immigrant source countries (US,
the UK group, and Western Europe) have relatively higher representation in the working
as a physician group compared to the medical degree holders who were trained in the non-
traditional immigrant source countries (Eastern Europe, the Asia groupings, South America
and the Caribbean).
In both the Canadian and US analyses, we control for the period of arrival of immigrant
medical degree holders. The arrival cohort categories for the US part of the analysis are
driven by the grouping in the public use version of the 1993 NSCG data. We used the
equivalent grouping for the 2003 NSCG for consistency and include dummies for having
arrived in the US in: 1) 1997-2003, 2) 1994-96, 3)1987-93, 4) 1980-1986 (default), 5) 1975-
79, 6) 1970-74, 7) 1965-69, 8) 1960-64, and 9) before 1960. In the Canadian analysis, the
Census data record year of arrival in single years and so we created cohort groupings to
match the policy regimes with dummies for: 1) 2002-06, 2) 1996-01, 3) 1993-95, 4) 1990-92,
5) 1986-89, 6) 1982-85 (default), 7) 1976-81, 8) 1971-75, 9) 1967-70, 10) 1962-66, and 11)
before 1961.
We also see large dierence across year of arrival groupings. A large share of the IMGs
admitted to Canada in our sample arrived since 1986, and for the cohorts since 1993, they
are over-represented in the `not working as a physician' group. The dierences are especially
stark for the post IRPA immigrants, the 2002-2006 cohort, which represent 37% of the men
and women who are not working as a physician in our sample.18 This is strong preliminary
evidence in support of our model's prediction that the immigrant medical degree holders
arriving in the 2002-2006 period would have a high rate of not participating in a relicensing
18It is important to recall that these individuals are permanent residents and that if they were participating
in a relicensing program, they would appear in our sample in the `working as a physician' category.
19program due to the fact that occupational restrictions were not in place in the point system.
The large share of IMGs who were admitted in the 1996 to 2001 period is not consistent
with a point system with strictly enforced occupational restrictions that banned physicians.
The fact that many more IMGs were admitted to Canada over this period and the fact that
a high share of them fall into the not working as a physician category raises the question
as to whether the immigrant selection system in Canada eectively excluded IMGs who did
not have pre-arranged employment. As noted above, this is the latter part of the 1986-2001
period which can be thought of a transitional period in the sense that a number of policy
initiatives were (or had been) put in place that made it easier for an IMG to enter Canada
without facing an occupational restriction.
While considerable variation in the US data is found by country of birth in Table 4, the
patterns are not simple and do not always match up with what was found for Canada. For
example, the South Asian born men comprise 26.1% of all foreign born IMGs who are working
as physicians, while only 15.1% of the immigrant men who are not working as physicians
are South Asian born (a similar pattern is found for South Asian women) representing a
high degree of successful integration. However, the same pattern does not exist in Table 3
where South Asian born men and women are roughly equally represented in the `working
as a physician' and the `not working as a physician' categories. Given the similarities in
medical education between Canada and the US, one would expect a similar rate of working
as a physician for South Asian IMGs in each country. Once again this is consistent with the
predictions of our theoretical model. It may be the case that the dierent immigrant selection
systems means that South Asian born individuals with foreign medical degrees do not nd
it easy to gain entry into the US but if they do gain entry they are able to relicense and
nd work as a physician. In contrast, under the Canadian point system, South Asian born
individuals with foreign medical degrees nd it relatively easy to enter Canada as immigrants
but then are in no way guaranteed to be admitted or able to complete the relicensing process
(perhaps due to a lack of language uency) and are unable to be employed as physicians. A
similar pattern is present for East Asia and to a less extent Eastern Europe.
20In contrast to the Canadian statistics, we do not see a trend towards more foreign born
IMGs in the US data across arrival cohorts. If anything the trend is towards fewer IMGs. As
was the case for Canada, we see higher rates of working as physician for IMGs from earlier
arrival cohorts. In the post 1987 period, the arrival cohorts are more highly represented in
the `not working as a physician' group. However, a comparison of these statistics by cohort
to the cohort means in Table 3 for Canada reveals more preliminary evidence that the US
employer nomination system for the selection of IMGs has led to higher rates of working as a
physician and a more stable number of IMGs admitted relative to the Canadian experience.
7 Econometric Specication and Empirical Results
The statistics presented above suggest that there are low rates of working as a physician for
IMGs in Canada relative to the US and that these dierences vary by country in which the
medical degree was obtained as well as period of arrival in the receiving country. However,
in order to fully disentangle the roles of immigrant status, period of arrival, and place of
medical training, we need to employ multivariate models in which the outcomes of interest
are: 1) whether an IMG is working as a physician and, more generally, 2) the occupational
outcomes of IMGs.
7.1 Working as a Physician
We estimate reduced form models over the binary outcome of working as a physician or not.
The index has the following general specication:









bRbi + "i (4)
Where Ii  0 if the medical degree holder is working as a physician (and Ii < 0 otherwise),
Xi is a set of personal characteristic (including age and its square, marital status, region
21of residence and size of place of residence), Mi is a vector of controls related to immigrant
status (indicators for being a permanent resident or a temporary resident with citizens as
the default as well as an indicator for having arrived before the age of 1719); the dai variables
identify the year of arrival for immigrants, the Dci variables identify the country in which the
medical degree was obtained; the Rbi variables identify the person's country of birth group
if an immigrant; and "i is a mean zero error term.
The eects captured by the immigrant arrival cohort controls will reect both dierences
across arrival cohort and assimilation eects towards working as a physician with time in the
new country. We explore this issue in the US analysis by interacting the cohort eects with
a year 1993 dummy variable for the cohorts present in both survey years, but do not nd
evidence to indicate assimilation eects are important for IMGs in the US. Unfortunately,
we cannot do the same analysis for Canada due to the fact that we have only a single
year of data. However, we believe cohort eects are likely to be much more important than
assimilation eects in the Canada case due to the large change in policy over time in Canada.
It is also important to note that the arrival cohort variables in both the Canadian and US
analyses are set to zero for temporary residents. This is due to the fact that the arrival
year information in the Canadian data is only available for the foreign born who are either
Canadian citizens or permanent residents.
In Table 5, marginal eects are presented that are derived from logit estimation of (4)
separately by gender for Canada. We estimate two versions of the model. The rst contains
a single dummy variable for having completed the medical degree outside of Canada and
another dummy that equals one if the medical degree was completed in the US. In the
second model, the dummy for studying medicine outside of Canada is replaced by a set of
10 dummies placed on country of study groupings. The estimates from the simpler model
are presented in the rst column for men and the third column for women. The marginal
eect of having studied outside of Canada (but not in the US) is a drop in the probability
of working as a physician of 24.4% for men and 38.8% for women indicating that there exist
19Permanent residents are the subset of immigrants who do not have the citizenship of the country of
residence (either the US or Canada in our analysis). Temporary residents are not considered to be immigrants.
22signicant challenges for IMGs in Canada to complete relicensing and work as a physician.
The marginal eects related to the US indicator variable are positive and signicant in each
case with the eect three times as large for women) indicating that US medical graduates in
Canada are more likely to work as physicians than are IMGs who studied in other countries
(but still signicantly less likely than Canadian-educated individuals).
Comparing these eects to those in the second and fourth columns where a richer set of
place of study controls and place of birth controls are employed, we see important variation in
the probability of working as a physician by place of study. The coecient on the indicator
for having completed a medical degree in the US is negative (-14.4%) for men but not
statistically signicant for women. Similarly, the coecients on the UK group place of study
variable is not signicant for men and only marginally so for women with an eect of -10.8%.
Large negative marginal probabilities are associated with having received a medical degree
from virtually all of the place of study groupings with the eects varying from -26.2% for
Western Europe to -59.2% for East Asia for men and -33.2% for Western Europe and -62.1%
for East Asia for women.
In Table 6, the equivalent models are estimated to those in Table 5 with the only dierence
being the US place of study dummy is replaced by a Canadian placed of study dummy. The
country of study eects dier substantially in the US analysis. Comparing the rst and third
columns of Table 6 to their counterparts in Table 5, we see much smaller coecients on the
indicator for having an international medical degree (-.0843 for men in the US compared to
-.242 for men in Canada, and -.182 for women in the US compared to -.388 for women in
Canada). Making equivalent comparison using the models with more detailed place of study
controls we see marginal eects for the place of study controls that are much closer to zero
in the US analysis. For men, the individual source country controls are not signicant for
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Western Asia, South Asia and Developed Asia in
the US analysis. These are all countries that were associated with large negative marginal
probabilities in the analysis for men in Canada. The eects for East Asia, South America
and Caribbean are signicant and range from -14.3% of -18.2% but are much smaller in
23absolute value than their equivalents in the Canadian analysis for men. In the US data,
broadly similar eects are found for women as were found for men. However, the negative
eect associated with a degree from Eastern Europe is larger for women in the US than for
men (-30.3% versus a statistically insignicant -11.4%) and similar dierences are found for
East Asia, South America and the Caribbean. For these groups of women, their experiences
at nding work as physicians may be more similar to those of men and women residing in
Canada who have medical degrees from these countries.
In Figure 1, we present these marginal probabilities associated with the place of study
variables for the case of men. The large negative eects are apparent for the IMGs who reside
in Canada but who studied in each of the countries except for the US and the UK group.
For the IMGs in the US, we do not see as large of dierences in the probability of working as
a physician (relative to those who studied in the US). Taken together, the estimates related
to place of study are consistent with our theoretical prediction that immigrant selection
based on a point system (without occupational restrictions) applies a lower standard for the
skill level of the potential IMG than does an employer nomination scheme (as indicated by
equation (2) where p < e and resulting in a higher probability of being unable to relicense
as a physician). However, given that a point system with occupational restrictions was in
place for many years prior to 2002, this indicates that the occupational restrictions may not
have been eective over that entire period since our model predicts that IMGs admitted
under the point system in this case should only be those nominated by an employer so
that they should have a probability of working as a physician which is similar to those
immigrating to the US. Given a distribution of skills for IMGs from a particular place of
education grouping, the US immigrant selection system selects IMGs who are more likely
to be able to relicense and work as a physician than are the IMGs selected from the same
country of study grouping in Canada.
It is important to note that the US estimates for female IMGs in a sense lie between
the Canadian estimates and the US estimates for male IMGs. One possible explanation is
that these immigrant women are more likely to have immigrated to the US under family
24reunication visas or as the spouses of male immigrants educated in another country. In this
case, the foreign medical credentials of female IMGs in the US may be less likely on average
to have been pre-screened (through employer nomination for a visa) than were their male
counterparts making it more dicult for at least some of these women to nd employment
as physicians.
In the second and fourth columns of Tables 5 and 6, we also present the coecients for
the two aggregated country of birth variables: Non-English language countries in Europe
and `Other', with English language countries being the default group.20 The `place of birth'
eects are generally not individually signicant in either the Canadian or US analysis with
the exception of the model for women estimated over the Canadian Census data where the
`Other' category has an eect of -18.6% on the probability of working as a physician. It is
not surprising that these eects are generally not signicant since much of the cross country
variation in probabilities of working as a physician are being picked up by the country of
education controls.
None of the marginal probabilities associated with the immigrant, permanent resident and
temporary resident controls in the Canadian analysis of Table 5 are individually signicant
with the exception of the -7.6% eect on the immigrant dummy in the third column for
women and the -8.4% eect associated with being a temporary resident in the fourth column
for women. In the US analysis of Table 6, more of these eects are signicant; however,
the magnitudes of these eects are all relatively small with the exception of the permanent
resident indicator for women and the temporary resident indicator for both men and women.
Arriving as a child is associated with lower probabilities of working as a physician for men
in the US.
The next group of variables in each table relate to the immigrant's arrival cohort. In the
Canadian analysis, we see large negative eects of having arrived in Canada as part of the
more recent immigrant arrival cohorts. In the rst column, with only limited controls for
place of study, we see especially large cohort eects with 20.8% lower probabilities of working
20Canada is considered an English language country for the purposes of the US analysis.
25as a physician for men and 26% lower probabilities of working as a physician for women for
those who arrived after 2001 relative to the 1982 to 1985 default cohort. The equivalent
eect for the1996-2001 cohort is -17.7% for men and -25.8% for women. For women, the
coecient on the 1993-95 cohort is also signicant at -15.1%.
For the most recent cohort (2002-06), the very low rates of working as a physician are
consistent with the prediction of our model that a movement to a point system without oc-
cupational restrictions (with the implementation of IRPA) would lead to a lower skill inow
of IMGs with a relatively low rate of relicensing (relative to the pure employer nomination
system of the default 1982-85 period). However, the low `employment as a physician' proba-
bilities for the IMGs who landed after 1992 for men and after 1989 for women (in the models
without place of study controls) is not consistent with the fact that a point system with
occupational restrictions existed at the federal level that should have barred IMGs without
pre-arranged employment. If this had been the case, then the probabilities of working as a
physician for these cohorts should have mirrored those for the default cohort as indicated
by equation (3)). However, as discussed in section 3, the large expansion of the immigration
program (especially for economic immigrants), coupled with the introduction of new routes
to permanent resident status that did not bar IMGs are consistent with the idea that lower
skill IMGs could have found a way into the country over this period of transition between
the hard occupational restrictions/employer nomination requirements of the 1976-85 period
and the point system without occupational restrictions of the 2002-06 period.
Dumont et al. (2008) provide another possible explanation for the increased entry of
IMGs after 1985. They note that IMGs may have entered as spouses of principal applicants
admitted through the point system. In this case, the IMG's spouse would only need enough
education and language uency along with intending to work in an occupation on the pre-
ferred list and the IMG could enter as the accompanying spouse. They note that between
1986 and 2001, approximately 29% of all landed immigrants intending to work as a general
practitioner were dependents (with the equivalent gure for specialist physicians being 12%).
This indicates a loss of control of the inow of physicians that occurred with the expansion
26of the intake of economic immigrants after 1985. As the number of economic immigrants
rose, there were more avenues through which IMGs could avoid the occupational restriction
and these options would not have existed in the US where, for example, an IMG realistically
could only accompany his/her spouse to the US if the spouse had pre-arranged employment.
The marginal eects on the cohort controls in Table 6 for the US analysis (relative to
the 1980-1986 default cohort), are generally much closer to zero than their counterparts in
the Canadian analysis.21 In terms of the post 1986 cohorts, for both men and women, the
only marginal eect that is individually signicant is the eect for men in the 1987-93 cohort
and this is only at the 10% level of signicance in the models with and without the detailed
place of study controls. This means that the worsening of the probability of working as a
physician that is apparent for both men and women in Canada is not present for IMGs in
the US.22 The cross cohort pattern in the model without the detailed place of study controls
moves closely with the pattern from the model that contains the place of study controls.
Unlike what was found for Canada, the inclusion of detailed place of study controls does not
have important eects on the estimated cross cohort proles. This is not surprising given
the relatively small role played by the place of study variables in explaining the probability
of working as a physician.
Taking the Canadian and US cross cohort patterns together, they are generally consistent
with the predictions of our theoretical model. The cross cohort patterns over the 1975
through 2002 period in the US are near zero (with the exception of the 1975-79 positive
eect for women) and certainly much smaller than the pronounced declines across cohorts
21In the US analysis, we also estimated the model with a set of interactions of these cohort variables
with a 1993 survey year indicator variable to allow for the identication of arrival cohort eects from the
eect of years-since-migration. See Borjas (1985) for a discussion. The coecient on these cohort/year-1993
interactions were mostly not individually signicant and the inclusion of these variables did not have an
important eect on the estimated coecients on the other variables in the model so we report results from
this simpler specication in order to facilitate comparisons with the Canadian analysis.
22However, it should be noted that the standard errors are somewhat large for the more recent US cohorts
especially for the 1997-03 cohort for women. This is driven by the fact that not many IMGs were admitted
with permanent residency status over this period which is consistent with the idea that IMGs rst enter as
temporary residents then convert later to permanent status. Recall that the arrival cohort controls only turn
on for the foreign born who are citizens or landed immigrants so there are not many observations for which
the 1997-03 cohort variable equals one. This is not an issue in the Canadian analysis since a much larger
share of the IMGs who are resident in Canada enter as permanent residents.
27in the post 1986 period for Canada and this is true for both male and female IMGs. These
cross country dierences in the cohort proles are especially large when we compare those
generated from the models without the detailed place of study controls. The ndings for
Canada in the post 1986 period are consistent with the removal of occupational restrictions
under the point system with the adoption of IRPA in early 2002 leading to a new inow
of IMGs with lower probabilities of working as physicians. In addition, changes between
1986 and 2001 to both the level of economic immigration and the stringency with which the
occupational restrictions were imposed appear to have led to signicantly lower probabilities
of working as a physician for the cohorts in the 1990s compared to those prior to 1986.23
7.2 Multinomial Logit Estimation of Occupational Model
Next, we investigate the occupational outcomes of medical degree holders. Of particular
interest is whether or not IMGs who do not work as physicians are employed in other higher
skill occupations. Our model is based on the possible outcomes: 1) working as a physician,
2) working in another higher skill occupation24, 3) working in a lower skill occupation25, or
4) not working (either unemployed or not in the labour force).26 The specication of each
index function of the model follows the general structure of equation (4).27
In Table 7, the marginal eects from the multinomial logit estimation are presented
23It is worth noting that the hypothesis appears to t the patterns for men more clearly than the patterns
for women. The decline in rates of working as an IMG for women in the US prior to the1980 arrival cohorts
is much larger than what was found for men. A similar pattern of high rates of working as a physician are
present for some of the same cohorts of female IMGs in Canada. Due to the low rate of having a medical
degree for women in these earlier generations, this may reect non random selection across time that is more
or less common to female IMGs in both countries.
24The other higher skill occupation group includes: computer scientists, computer analysts, mathemati-
cians, scientists, social scientists, engineers, nurses, pharmacists, teachers, managers, architects, accountants,
actuaries, clergy, counselors, social workers, lawyers, judges, librarians, insurance occupations and business
occupations.
25The lower skill occupation group includes: transportation/material moving, precision/production,
installation/maintenance/repair, service, sales, other admin, secretaries/receptionists/typists, farm-
ers/foresters/shermen, construction/extraction, technologists, technicians, clerks and book-keepers.
26See Green (1999) for a similar multinomial model of occupational outcomes of immigrants applied to
the Canadian case.
27We re-estimated the econometrical model using the multinomial probit estimator and found qualitatively
similar results.
28separately for men and women in Canada. In order to reduce the number of tables, we
focus attention on estimates using the model with the detailed place of study controls. For
individuals who received their medical degrees from countries other than Canada, the US and
the UK group, strong negative marginal eects are present in terms of lower probabilities of
working as a physician ranging from -23.7% for Western Europe to -58.1% for East Asia for
men and from -32% for Western Europe to -62.9% for East Asia for women. The multinomial
logit analysis allows us to separate these dierences according to the three sub-categories
of the `not working as a physician' category from the simple logit analysis. While many of
the coecients on the place of study controls are signicant, for most countries the lower
probability of working as a physician is typically associated with a higher probability of being
either in the lower skilled occupation category or in the not working category. For example,
male IMGs in Canada with medical degrees from South Asia are 35.4% less likely to work
as physicians and are 30.9% more likely to be either working in a lower skill occupation or
not working (relative to men with Canadian medical degrees). A similar pattern is present
for female IMGs but with a relatively greater probability being placed on the not working
category for IMGs with degrees from these countries. Figure 2 illustrates these estimates for
men. The rst two bars of each group relate to the men with medical degrees from either
the US or the UK group for whom recognition of their educational credentials is relatively
easier than for other IMGs. For men with medical degrees from other countries, we see large
drops in the probability of working as a physician (relative to a Canadian medical degree
holder) associated with somewhat higher probabilities of working in the other higher skill
category but larger still probabilities of working in both the lower skill and the not working
categories. These general patterns indicate broader diculties gaining a reasonable return
on their foreign medical human capital for IMGs from these countries in Canada.
The results also support the theoretical prediction that IMGs admitted under a point
system (without occupational restrictions) have lower average skill levels and higher prob-
abilities of being unable to relicense as a physician. The fact that such a large fraction of
the IMGs are either employed in lower skill occupations or are not working is consistent
29with them having a low level of skill relative to holders of Canadian medical degrees. It is
also evidence against the type of negative selection found by Kugler and Sauer (2005) for
IMGs in Israel since it does not appear that many of the IMGs trained in non-traditional
source countries are employed in other higher skill occupations. However, the pattern for US
trained physicians is consistent with the idea of negative selection since we see both lower
probabilities of working a physician and higher probabilities of working in another higher
skill occupation for male IMGs.
The strong pattern of decreasing probability of working as a physician for more recent
arrival cohorts is present for both men and women as was the case in Table 5, but the multi-
nomial logit estimation allows us to see the breakdown of these eects across the dierent
categories within the `not working as a physician' category. The negative cohort eects for
more recent cohorts of male IMGs related to working as a physician are also associated with
positive marginal eects for the three other categories (however, these eects are only clearly
signicant for men for the 1996-01 cohort). For female IMGs, the negative arrival cohort
eects in the `working as a physician' category are larger in absolute value than what is found
for men, and correspond to a large increase in the probability of working either in lower skill
occupations or not working. For example, female IMGs who arrived in the 1996-2001 period
have a 21.8% lower probability of working as a physician, an 11.1% higher probability of
working in a lower skill occupation, and a 6.8% higher probability of not working relative to
the female IMGs in the default category (those arriving between 1982 and 1985).
Taken together, these MNL eects represent more cause for concern in terms of Canadian
immigration policy's capacity to select IMGs who will nd employment in jobs that are suited
to their skill levels. Given the high level of training of a medical graduate, one would expect
that if the person was unable to work as a physician, he/she would still have the human
capital needed to nd employment in some other higher skill occupation. However, this does
not appear to be the case. One possibility is that it may be related to poor language skills
which would create a barrier to the IMG working either as a physician or in another high
skill job but may be less of an impediment to nding work in a low skill job.
30In Table 8, marginal eects are presented from multinomial logit analysis of the occupa-
tional outcomes of medical degree holders using the US data. For men the marginal eects
associated with the UK group, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Western Asia and
South Asia place of study groups are not individually signicant, a result consistent with
what was found in the logit estimation for these groups of men in Table 5. For male IMGs
who studied in East Asia, South America and the Caribbean, we see lower probabilities of
working as a physician that range from -13.1 to -19%. For each of these three groups, there
is either a higher probability of working in a lower skill occupation (East Asia and South
America) or of not working (Caribbean). Women educated in Eastern Europe have a much
lower probability of working as a physician (-0.519) but this is only signicant at the 10%
level and the equivalent coecient on the lower skilled occupation for this group of female
IMGs is positive but not statistically signicant. As was found in Table 7, medical degree
holders trained in East Asia, South America and the Caribbean are less likely to work as
a physician (than those trained in the US) and we now see that this coincides with higher
probabilities of being in the lower skill occupations. This is similar to what was found in
Table 7 for female IMGs who studied in these countries and reside in Canada. Their lower
probabilities of working as a physician also coincide with a higher probability of working in
lower skill occupations.
Figure 3 illustrates the place of study eects for males in the US and is comparable to
Figure 2 which contains the equivalent eects from the Canadian analysis for men. The
large negative eects on probability of working as a physician and the positive eects on
the probability of working in other occupations (especially the low skill and not working
at all) found for male IMGs in Canada are almost completely absent from the US analysis
represented by Figure 3. Comparing the patterns in Figure 2 and Figure 3, we see more
evidence in support of this view that employer nomination leads to high probabilities of
IMGs working as physicians in the receiving country and low probabilities of working in
lower skill occupations or not working at all relative to the Canadian case where employer
nomination is less likely to be the route that an IMG would take to enter Canada. However,
31it is worth noting that the patterns for female IMGs in the US are in a sense closer to those
of female IMGs in Canada relative to the pronounced dierences seen for male IMGs in the
US and Canada. As already stated, this could be due to the fact that female IMGs may be
more likely to be tied movers in the US compared to their male counterparts and so they
may be more likely to be accompanying spouses where their husbands enter Canada with
pre-arranged employment.
Finally, the arrival cohort patterns in the multinomial logit analysis for both men and
women in the US in Table 8 do not reveal clear cohort patterns at least over the post 1980
period. This is consistent with the logit estimates in Table 6 and is in contrast to the cohort
patterns found in the multinomial logit estimates for both male and female IMGs in Canada
from Table 7.
In summary, the empirical ndings generally support the predictions of our theoretical
model at least with respect to the employer nomination model for the US and the point
system model without occupational restrictions for Canada. The lower probability of working
as a physician for IMGs in Canada relative to the US is consistent with the idea that a point
system without eective occupational restrictions is likely to admit a large fraction of IMGs
who will be unable to work as a physician relative to an employer nomination approach
to the admission of skilled immigrants. In addition, the fact that the IMGs who do not
work as physicians are more concentrated in the less skilled occupation or the not working
category in Canada compared with the US is also consistent with the prediction of the model
that the average skill level of IMGs admitted under this type of point system will be lower
than those admitted under an employer nomination system. The comparison of the source
country specic probabilities of working as a physician and working in other high skill or low
skill occupations is also consistent with our hypothesis since it indicates that the employer
nomination system of the US selected higher skill IMGs from non-traditional source countries
whereas the Canadian system allowed a wider range of the skill distribution into Canada from
these countries. Finally, the cross cohort patterns in the probabilities of IMGs working as
physicians or in other occupations are also consistent with our hypothesis that the Canadian
32selection system was less restrictive than the US employer nomination system in terms of the
skills required in order to immigrate after: 1) the elimination of occupational restrictions in
the point system in early 2002 and 2) (to a lesser extent) after the expansion of the inow
of economic immigrants and the partial relaxation of occupational restrictions over the 1986
to 2001 period.
7.3 Alternative Explanations to the Immigrant Selection Policy
Interpretation
While the estimates are supportive of our hypotheses, it is important to reect on other pos-
sible explanations for our results. One possibility is that the IMGs selected in each country
had similar skill distributions but that the required skill level was higher for relicensing in
Canada relative to the US. Given the high degree of integration between the American and
Canadian systems of relicensing and credential recognition for physicians, we do not believe
this to be the case. However, if it were the case, the relatively poor outcomes of IMGs arriv-
ing in Canada demonstrates the dangers of a disconnect between immigrant selection policy
and relicensing policy in a regulated profession such as medicine. It is also worth noting that
if the US had an increase across time in its required skill level for relicensing (which could
be thought of as an increase in e) this would not lead to an increase in IMGs unable to
work as a physician since only IMGs who met the new higher skill level would be admitted
under the employer nomination system. Consequently, we believe that even if dierences in
the medical relicensing process exist between Canada and the US, our empirical results still
show an important role played for immigrant selection regimes in determining the fraction
of IMGs who go on to work as physicians and the fraction who instead work in other high
skill occupations versus low skill occupations.
Another possibility is that the distribution of IMGs wishing to migrate to the US has a
higher mean than the distribution of IMGs wishing to migrate to Canada. Given the high
physician salaries in the US relative to Canada (see McDonald, Warman, and Worswick
33(2011)), it seems likely that high skill IMGs may prefer to migrate to the US which would
shift up the mean of the skill distribution and could explain the high rates of working as a
physician. However, for the same reasons, we would expect middle and low skill IMGs to
also want to work in the US so that while the total number of IMGs wishing to migrate
to the US may rise due to this preference for the US over Canada it is unclear that the
distribution of skill would be aected. Even if it were the case that the US skill distribution
for IMGs wishing to migrate to the US had a higher mean than the skill distribution for IMGs
wishing to migrate to Canada, our empirical results still show a high rate of not working as
a physician and of working in low skill occupations for the Canadian IMGs which we take as
evidence of the importance of the immigrant selection system since an employer nomination
system would exclude the IMG applicants with low skill.
8 Conclusions
The substantial number of immigrants with medical degrees in Canada and the United States
who are not employed as physicians is a cause for concern given the shortages of physicians
in some areas, particularly those areas that are more rural or remote. The Canadian point
system for the selection of skilled immigrants may contribute to this occupational mismatch
by recognizing the value of a foreign medical degree in terms of the immigrant selection
criteria without taking into account the individual's qualications to practice medicine in
Canada. In contrast, the lack of a comparable point system for US immigration coupled
with the fact that employers can sponsor skilled workers ultimately leading to permanent
residency in the US means that a very dierent selection system is in place, one where
credential recognition by employers may ensure that the international medical graduate
(IMG) who becomes a resident of the US is much more likely to be able to nd suitable
employment given his/her training than is the case under the Canadian selection system.
Logit analysis of the incidence of working as a physician among medical degree holders
in Canada indicates that those individuals with medical degrees from non-English language
34countries are much less likely to work as a physician than are holders of domestic medical
degrees. In contrast, the equivalent analysis for the US indicates either no dierence or
much smaller dierences in incidences of working as a physician for individuals with medical
degrees from these countries. These ndings are consistent with our theoretical analysis
indicating that the dierent immigrant selection systems in Canada and the US are leading
to an intake of foreign medical degree holders into Canada who are unable to nd work
as physicians but that the equivalent system in the US prevents the entry of equivalent
individuals.
A multinomial logit analysis that distinguished between the skill level of the alternative
occupation as well as the unemployed/NLF outcome leads to similar conclusions. In addition,
the results show that for Canada, the medical degree holders from non-English language
countries are more likely to be either employed in low skill occupations or to fall into the
not working category than are individuals with medical degrees acquired in Canada. Our
analysis supports the hypothesis that dierences in immigrant selection policy mean that
foreign medical degree holders are more likely to be able to immigrate to Canada than to the
US, making the problem of credential recognition a relatively larger one for Canada relative
to the US.
The cross cohort patterns since 1975 for the US indicate that declines in the probability
of working as a physician were either zero or small and this is consistent with our theoretical
ndings that an employer nomination system where the standard for receiving a job oer
does not change would lead to the same average skills and probability of relicensing as a
physician for IMGs across time. For Canada, we see similar probabilities of working as
a physician for IMGs admitted between 1976 and 1985, a period in which either a point
system with a strict occupational restriction against physicians was in place unless the IMG
had pre-arranged employment. However, after 1985, we see a decline in the probability of
working as a physician for IMGs which coincided with a large expansion of the economic
class of immigrants and an erosion of the eectiveness of the occupational restrictions against
physicians. After the switch to a point system without occupation restrictions was in put
35in place in 2002, we observe much lower probabilities of working as a physician for IMGs in
Canada relative to those arriving in the early 1980s.
In terms of US policy implications, our analysis sheds light on the likely impact on the
supply of relatively low skill workers to regulated professions due to the introduction of a
point system such as the one in Canada where selection is based primarily on human capital
proxy variables without accounting for probabilities of credential recognition. Introducing a
system like this in the US could exacerbate problems related to the recognition of foreign
medical credentials and could lead to similar problems in terms of recognition of foreign
credentials in other professions that are regulated in a similar manner. In terms of Cana-
dian policy implications, given the relatively poor labour market outcomes in Canada of
IMGs from non-English language countries, an improvement in outcomes is likely to occur
if occupational restrictions limiting admission of IMGs are reinstated to prevent immigrants
without pre-arranged employment from being admitted. Changes to Canadian immigration
policy after 2006 have moved the system in this direction since applicants under the Skilled
Worker program must either have pre-arranged employment or their intended occupation
must be on a list of occupations. However, physicians are on the current list of acceptable
occupations and so the newly reinstated occupational restrictions do not aect IMGs wishing
to immigrate to Canada.
It is not possible to say from our analysis that an employer nomination system of im-
migration is superior to a point system based on human capital or one augmented with
occupational restrictions. In order to address this question one would need to look at all
occupations and all types of immigrants. However, with the current trend in many countries
towards human capital based point systems, our analysis shows the risk that is present in
terms of creating severe occupational imbalances (especially with regard to regulated pro-
fessions) which are not present within an employer nomination system either theoretically
or empirically for the case of the US immigration since 1975 or the case of the Canadian
immigration during the 1982-85 period in Canada when a de facto employer nomination
system was in place.
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39Table 1: Location of Study for Medical Degree Holders (%), 29-65 in Canada and the US: 
Canada US 
 Men  Women   Men  Women
Canada 70.4  63.4  US  85.3  78.9 
US 2.4  1.7  Canada  0.9  0.6 
UK/Ireland/Aus/NZ
a 8.1 4.1  UK/Ireland/Aus/NZ
a 0.8 0.9 
Western Europe  1.9  1.8  Western Europe  1.6  1.0 
Eastern Europe  3.2  7.9  Eastern Europe  0.7  2.8 
Africa
b 2.1 2.3  Africa
b   0.5  0.4 
Western Asia  2.7  2.7  Western Asia  0.9  0.4 
South Asia  2.9  5.5  South Asia  2.7  4.0 
Eastern Asia  3.0  7.3  Eastern Asia  2.2  6.6 
Developed Asia
c 1.3 1.0  Developed  Asia
c 0.8 0.7 
South America  1.3  1.6  South America  2.4  2.4 
Caribbean 0.7  0.8  Caribbean 1.4  1.3 
Sample 9,192  6,383    6,719  2,417 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada, “2006 Canadian Census: 20 Percent 
Master File,” and the 1993 and 2003 US National Survey of College Graduates. 
Note: All statistics are in percentage terms. 
a: Also includes Israel and South Africa 
b: Excludes South Africa  
c: Includes Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
Table 2: Occupational Outcomes for Medical Degree Holders: Canada and US, 29-65 
Canada US 
Studied in Canada  Men  Women  Studied in US  Men  Women
Physician (incl. specialist)  91.2  88.1  Physician (incl. specialist)  87.1  78.2 
Other Higher Skill Occup.  4.6  4.7  Other High Skill Occup.  7.4  9.8 
Lower Skill Occupation  1.8  3.7  Low Skill Occupation  1.8  4.7 
Not Working  2.5  3.6  Not Working  3.7  7.3 
Sample Size  6,471  4,041  Sample Size  5,091  1,697 
          
Studied outside Canada  Men  Women  Studied outside US  Men  Women
Physician (incl. specialist)  57.2  33.0  Physician (incl. specialist)  73.5  54.8 
Other Higher Skill Occup.  12.7  14.5  Other Higher Skill Occup.  8.8  13.3 
Lower Skill Occupation  15.2  21.1  Lower Skill Occupation  10.7  18.2 
Not Working  14.9  31.4  Not Working  7.0  13.7 
Sample Size  2,721  2,342  Sample Size  1,628  720 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada, “2006 Canadian Census: 20 Percent  
Master File,” and the 1993 and 2003 US National Survey of College Graduates. 
Note: All statistics are in percentage terms. 
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Total Working  as 
Physician 




a 30.0 41.6  35.5  27.2  41.4 37.2 
Place of Study             
US 2.2 0.9  1.6  3.3 0.5  1.3 
UK/Ire/Aus/NZ
b 35.9 3.6  20.7  21.3 2.0 7.6 
Western Europe 4.7  3.0  3.9  6.1 1.8  3.1 
Eastern Europe 7.3  14.0  10.5  19.2 23.4  22.2 
Africa
c 13.4 10.0  11.8  9.4 8.2  8.6 
Western Asia 7.0  17.9  12.1  6.2 9.9  8.8 
South Asia 13.0  14.7  13.8  18.2 16.8  17.2 
Developed Asia
d 4.4 6.2  5.2  1.9 2.7  2.5 
East Asia 5.9  20.0  12.6  8.7 27.9  22.2 
South America 3.9  6.4  5.1  3.5 5.4  4.8 
Caribbean 2.0  3.0  2.5  2.1 1.5  1.7 
Period of Landing            
2002-06 23.1 36.8  29.6  22.4 36.7  32.5 
1996-01 16.1 28.9  22.1  22.1 35.8  31.7 
1993-95 2.4 3.5  2.9  4.1 4.2  4.2 
1990-92 7.6 7.1  7.3  7.2 6.5  6.7 
1986-89 9.1 6.1  7.7  8.6 3.0  4.7 
1982-85 12 8.9  10.6  13.1 8.1 9.6 
1976-81 10 3.7  7.0  6.6 2.6  3.8 
1971-75 13.7 2.9  8.6  10.2 1.5 4.1 
1967-71 * *  2.7  * *  * 
1962-66 0.8 *  *  * *  * 
Before 1961 *  *  *  * *  * 
Arrived age 17 or less 4.0  2.7  3.4  3.1 1.0  1.6 
N 1,160  1,030  2,190  615  1,450  2,065 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada, “2006 Canadian Census: 20 Percent  
Master File,” and the 1993 and 2003 US National Survey of College Graduates. A *  
denotes a statistic with too small of a sample size to be released by Statistics Canada. 
a: This table excludes temporary residents since year of arrival and age at arrival are not reported 
b: Also includes Israel and South Africa 
c: Excludes South Africa  
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as a Physician 
Total Working  as 
Physician 
Not Working 
as a Physician 
Total 
Permanent resident  27.2 38.7  30.5  22.8 36.0  29.3 
Place of birth:             
Canada   5.9  2.4  4.9  4.2  0.2  2.2 
UK/Ireland/Aus./NZ   5.3  3.5  4.7  2.3  1.1  1.7 
Western Europe   4.5  4.8  4.6  6.4  1.0  3.7 
Eastern Europe   4.6  7.7  5.5  13.0  13.3  13.2 
Africa 5.1  5.3  5.1  4.4  1.0  2.8 
Western Asia   9.5  5.6  8.4  4.7  1.5  3.1 
South Asia  26.3  15.1  23.0  30.7  11.5  21.3 
East Asia   15.2  21.1  16.9  23.0  42.3  32.4 
Developed Asia   7.5  3.3  6.3  3.6  5.2  4.3 
South America  9.7  20.0  12.7  3.3  14.6  8.8 
Caribbean 5.9  11.4  7.5  4.4  7.5  5.9 
Other Country  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.8  0.4 
Arrived 1997-03   2.7  7.5  4.1  5.2  6.3  5.8 
Arrived 1994-96  4.6  6.2  5.1  7.4  15.9  11.6 
Arrived 1987-93  14.2  33.6  19.8  18.6  31.5  24.9 
Arrived 1980-86  17.1  20.1  18.0  19.3  23.4  21.3 
Arrived 1975-79  16.5  9.6  14.5  13.1  5.9  9.6 
Arrived 1970-74  20.8  9.9  17.6  18.2  11.2  14.8 
Arrived 1965-69   15.0  5.1  12.1  12.2  4.2  8.3 
Arrived 1960-64  5.9  5.5  5.8  3.9  0.9  2.4 
Arrived before 1960  3.1  2.6  3.0  2.1  0.6  1.4 
Arrived as a child  7.5  4.7  6.7  4.8  4.1  4.5 
Sample Size  1,110  271  1,381 391  228  619 
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on the 1993 and 2003 US National Survey of College 
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Place of Study         
Not in Canada  -0.242**  -  -0.388**  - 
 [0.0199]    [0.0301]   
US 0.0679**  -0.144**  0.201**  -0.0619 
 [0.0139]  [0.0431]  [0.0174]  [0.0641] 
UK/Ireland/Aus./NZ -  -0.0439  -  -0.108+ 
   [0.0289]    [0.0597] 
Western Europe  -  -0.262**  -  -0.332** 
   [0.0529]    [0.0718] 
Eastern Europe  -  -0.478**  -  -0.540** 
   [0.0476]    [0.0442] 
Africa -  -0.299**  -  -0.428** 
   [0.0519]    [0.0637] 
Western Asia  -  -0.406**  -  -0.412** 
   [0.0479]    [0.0598] 
South Asia  -  -0.377**  -  -0.403** 
   [0.0461]    [0.0458] 
East Asia  -  -0.592**  -  -0.621** 
   [0.0411]    [0.0300] 
Developed Asia  -  -0.365**  -  -0.468** 
   [0.0660]    [0.0750] 
South America  -  -0.458**  -  -0.458** 
   [0.0676]    [0.0658] 
Caribbean -  -0.534**  -  -0.434** 
   [0.0693]    [0.0767] 
Place of Birth         
Non–English /Europe  -  -0.0266  -  -0.0714 
   [0.0291]    [0.0567] 
Other -  -0.0416+  -  -0.186** 
   [0.0235]    [0.0469] 
Immigrant -0.0343+  0.00206  -0.0758*  0.0611 
 [0.0191]  [0.0257]  [0.0386]  [0.0529] 
Permanent Resident  0.0173  -0.00214  -0.0370  -0.0836* 
 [0.0169]  [0.0212]  [0.0334]  [0.0383] 
Temporary Resident  -0.00527  0.0162  -0.0946+  -0.0266 
 [0.0223]  [0.0268]  [0.0510]  [0.0627] 
Child Immigrant  -0.0542+  -0.0355  -0.0104  -0.00827 
 [0.0314]  [0.0301]  [0.0492]  [0.0511] 
Arrival Cohort         
Arrived 2002-06  -0.208**  -0.145**  -0.260**  -0.210** 
 [0.0460]  [0.0452]  [0.0550]  [0.0592] 
Arrived 1996-01  -0.177**  -0.127**  -0.258**  -0.220** 
 [0.0340]  [0.0325]  [0.0432]  [0.0457] 
Arrived 1993-95  -0.102+  -0.0862  -0.151*  -0.110 
 [0.0546]  [0.0583]  [0.0767]  [0.0802] 
  43    Arrived 1990-92  -0.0217  -0.0288  -0.0980+  -0.120* 
 [0.0256]  [0.0278]  [0.0539]  [0.0586] 
Arrived  1986-89  0.00781 0.00774 0.0460  0.0603 
 [0.0217]  [0.0232]  [0.0400]  [0.0425] 
Arrived 1976-81  0.0708**  0.0603**  0.0597  0.0336 
 [0.0131]  [0.0160]  [0.0424]  [0.0488] 
Arrived 1971-75  0.0960**  0.0860**  0.194**  0.183** 
 [0.0101]  [0.0134]  [0.0209]  [0.0265] 
Arrived 1967-70  0.0760**  0.0547**  0.184**  0.159** 
 [0.0154]  [0.0207]  [0.0261]  [0.0372] 
Arrived 1962-66  0.0562*  0.0149  0.176**  0.131+ 
 [0.0278]  [0.0411]  [0.0399]  [0.0696] 
Arrived before 1961  0.0789**  0.0626*  -0.0174  -0.100 
 [0.0186]  [0.0245]  [0.0823]  [0.0988] 
Age 0.0153**  0.0131**  0.0296**  0.0338** 
 [0.00401]  [0.00425]  [0.00750]  [0.00799] 
Age
2/100 -0.0190**  -0.0172**  -0.0386**  -0.0441** 
 [0.00424]  [0.00447]  [0.00835]  [0.00887] 
Sample Size  9,192  9,192  6,383  6,383 
 
Note:  
1)  Models also included controls for marital status, major city and province.  
2)  Robust standard errors in square brackets. 
3)  **, * and + denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
4)  See Table 3 notes for definitions of the region of education variables 
Source: Estimates are generated by the authors based on Statistics Canada, 2006 Canadian 
Census: 20 Percent Master File.  
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Place of Study        
Not in US  -0.0843**  -  -0.182**  - 
  [0.0251]  [0.0479]  
Canada 0.107**  0.0888**  0.232**  0.213** 
 [0.0126]  [0.0209]  [0.0164]  [0.0246] 
UK/Ireland/Aus./NZ -  -0.0166  -  0.126+ 
   [0.0423]    [0.0667] 
Western Europe  -  -0.0437  -  0.0517 
   [0.0518]    [0.0903] 
Eastern Europe  -  -0.114  -  -0.303* 
   [0.0701]    [0.131] 
Africa -  -0.00475  -  0.121 
   [0.0565]    [0.0791] 
Western Asia  -  -0.00758  -  -0.00895 
   [0.0451]    [0.126] 
South Asia  -  0.00358  -  0.0767 
   [0.0303]    [0.0508] 
East Asia  -  -0.143**  -  -0.346** 
   [0.0464]    [0.0697] 
Developed Asia  -  -0.000552  -  -0.143 
   [0.0470]    [0.138] 
South America  -  -0.142**  -  -0.375** 
   [0.0493]    [0.0932] 
Caribbean -  -0.182**  -  -0.352** 
   [0.0594]    [0.115] 
Place of Birth         
Non–English /Europe  -  -0.0207  -  0.0845 
   [0.0365]    [0.0751] 
Other -  -0.00152  -  -0.00343 
   [0.0285]    [0.0801] 
Immigrant -0.0608*  -0.0731+  -0.0234  -0.0223 
 [0.0291]  [0.0432]  [0.0553]  [0.0901] 
Permanent Resident  -0.0549+  -0.0509+  -0.130*  -0.191** 
 [0.0287]  [0.0284]  [0.0565]  [0.0592] 
Temporary Resident  -0.136*  -0.160*  -0.196*  -0.185 
 [0.0641]  [0.0739]  [0.0993]  [0.141] 
Child Immigrant  -0.131*  -0.102*  -0.0466  -0.0251 
 [0.0533]  [0.0482]  [0.0760]  [0.0711] 
Arrival Cohort         
Arrived  1997-03  -0.113  -0.129 -0.0892 -0.129 
 [0.0872]  [0.102]  [0.163]  [0.150] 
Arrived 1994-96  -0.00510  -0.00592  -0.106  -0.108 
 [0.0484]  [0.0495]  [0.0978]  [0.0919] 
Arrived 1987-93  -0.0856+  -0.0723+  -0.105  -0.0975 
 [0.0441]  [0.0402]  [0.0672]  [0.0689] 
  45    Arrived 1975-79  0.0570**  0.0526**  0.153**  0.128** 
 [0.0188]  [0.0199]  [0.0308]  [0.0354] 
Arrived 1970-74  0.0792**  0.0731**  0.137**  0.120** 
 [0.0156]  [0.0172]  [0.0365]  [0.0433] 
Arrived 1965-69  0.0973**  0.0957**  0.194**  0.203** 
 [0.0115]  [0.0119]  [0.0240]  [0.0220] 
Arrived 1960-64  0.0550*  0.0559*  0.187**  0.179** 
 [0.0232]  [0.0228]  [0.0335]  [0.0373] 
Arrived before 1960  0.0580*  0.0611*  0.159**  0.127* 
 [0.0266]  [0.0255]  [0.0444]  [0.0605] 
Age 0.0206**  0.0213**  0.0177  0.0171 
 [0.00669]  [0.00668]  [0.0164]  [0.0165] 
Age
2/100 -0.0270**  -0.0276**  -0.0305+  -0.0299+ 
 [0.00668]  [0.00668]  [0.0177]  [0.0179] 
1993 Survey Indicator  0.0344**  0.0346**  0.00160  0.0100 
 [0.0125]  [0.0126]  [0.0271]  [0.0274] 
Sample Size   6,719  6,719  2,417  2,417 
Note:  
1)  Models also include controls for marital status and region. 
2)  Robust standard errors in square brackets. 
3)  **, * and + denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
4)  See Table 4 notes for definitions of the region of education variables 
Source: Estimates are generated by the authors using the public use files of the 1993 and 2003 
NCGS. 
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Place of Study                
US -0.129**  0.098**  0.005  0.026  -0.073  0.057  -0.033  0.049 
 [0.040]  [0.035]  [0.016]  [0.019]  [0.062] [0.042] [0.026] [0.045] 
UK/Ire./Aus./NZ -0.035  0.015  0.007  0.012  -0.105+  0.027  -0.014  0.092* 
 [0.027]  [0.018]  [0.017]  [0.014]  [0.058] [0.042] [0.025] [0.046] 
Western Europe  -0.237**  0.128**  0.058+  0.052+  -0.320**  0.141*  0.035  0.144* 
 [0.050]  [0.038]  [0.032]  [0.030]  [0.075] [0.066] [0.040] [0.069] 
Eastern Europe  -0.481**  0.088**  0.214**  0.179**  -0.535**  0.157**  0.186**  0.193** 
 [0.052]  [0.030]  [0.057]  [0.050]  [0.047] [0.052] [0.053] [0.062] 
Africa -0.277**  0.051  0.097**  0.129**  -0.425**  0.035  0.077+  0.312** 
 [0.052]  [0.037]  [0.033]  [0.040]  [0.069] [0.036] [0.046] [0.075] 
Western Asia  -0.394**  0.088**  0.152**  0.153**  -0.406**  0.019  0.095+  0.292** 
 [0.050]  [0.033]  [0.042]  [0.043]  [0.065] [0.030] [0.057] [0.067] 
South Asia  -0.354**  0.045+  0.195**  0.114**  -0.400**  0.013  0.140**  0.247** 
 [0.048]  [0.025]  [0.044]  [0.037]  [0.049] [0.024] [0.046] [0.054] 
East Asia  -0.581**  0.199**  0.248**  0.134**  -0.629**  0.133**  0.262**  0.234** 
 [0.043]  [0.041]  [0.051]  [0.038]  [0.032] [0.042] [0.057] [0.053] 
Developed Asia  -0.343**  0.059+  0.088*  0.196**  -0.461**  0.021  0.127  0.313** 
 [0.069]  [0.034]  [0.039]  [0.058]  [0.083] [0.046] [0.079] [0.089] 
South America  -0.445**  0.124**  0.223**  0.098*  -0.467**  0.089  0.219**  0.159** 
 [0.067]  [0.046]  [0.058]  [0.043]  [0.068] [0.055] [0.072] [0.059] 
Caribbean -0.519**  0.030  0.286**  0.203**  -0.454**  -0.032  0.332**  0.154* 
 [0.072]  [0.048]  [0.081]  [0.069]  [0.078] [0.030] [0.090] [0.078] 
Place of Birth                 
Non–Eng./Europe -0.032 0.020 0.019  -0.007  -0.069 0.004 0.004  0.061 
 [0.029]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.010]  [0.053] [0.028] [0.027] [0.040] 
Other  -0.044+ 0.005 0.021  0.018  -0.170**  0.066*  0.019  0.085** 
 [0.023]  [0.014]  [0.016]  [0.012]  [0.043] [0.031] [0.024] [0.030] 
Immigrant 0.006  0.002  -0.010  0.002  0.049  -0.008  -0.009  -0.032 
 [0.024]  [0.017]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.047] [0.030] [0.029] [0.025] 
Permanent Resident  -0.000  -0.009  -0.001  0.010  -0.062+  -0.031*  0.033+  0.060** 
 [0.020]  [0.013]  [0.006]  [0.010]  [0.036] [0.013] [0.019] [0.020] 
Temporary Resident  -0.003  0.030  -0.023**  -0.004  -0.017  0.041  -0.027  0.002 
 [0.029]  [0.025]  [0.004]  [0.013]  [0.057] [0.044] [0.024] [0.029] 
Arrived as child  -0.034  0.003  -0.005  0.035+  -0.014  0.003  -0.020  0.030 
 [0.029]  [0.020]  [0.008]  [0.019]  [0.049] [0.032] [0.022] [0.035] 
Arrived 2002-06  -0.121**  0.040  0.018  0.063*  -0.198**  0.065+  0.043  0.090** 
 [0.042]  [0.028]  [0.013]  [0.028]  [0.058] [0.036] [0.028] [0.034] 
Arrived 1996-01  -0.114**  0.057*  0.032*  0.025+  -0.218**  0.039+  0.111**  0.068** 
 [0.031]  [0.023]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.045] [0.022] [0.032] [0.024] 
Arrived 1993-95  -0.084  0.047  0.029  0.008  -0.116  0.010  0.087+  0.019 
 [0.058]  [0.042]  [0.022]  [0.019]  [0.078] [0.034] [0.048] [0.031] 
Arrived 1990-92  -0.020  -0.001  0.029+  -0.008  -0.125*  -0.013  0.118**  0.020 
 [0.026]  [0.017]  [0.016]  [0.009]  [0.058] [0.022] [0.043] [0.024] 
Arrived 1986-89  0.007  -0.003  0.006  -0.011  0.047  -0.032+  0.009  -0.025 
  47     [0.022]  [0.017]  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.040] [0.017] [0.026] [0.016] 
Arrived 1976-81  0.050**  -0.016  -0.012*  -0.022**  0.008  -0.035*  0.058  -0.031+ 
 [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.049] [0.017] [0.039] [0.016] 
Arrived 1971-75  0.074**  -0.026*  -0.021**  -0.027** 0.165**  -0.059** -0.053** -0.053** 
 [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.023] [0.012] [0.013] [0.009] 
Arrived 1967-70  0.050*  -0.022  -0.013+  -0.015* 0.152** -0.049** -0.055** -0.048** 
 [0.020]  [0.016]  [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.030] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] 
Arrived 1962-66  0.003  0.008  0.002  -0.013  0.080  -0.090**  0.090  -0.081** 
 [0.044]  [0.038]  [0.022]  [0.012]  [0.098] [0.005] [0.097] [0.005] 
Arrived before 1961  0.053*  -0.017  -0.015  -0.022**  -0.099  0.049  0.077  -0.026 
 [0.025]  [0.020]  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.099] [0.066] [0.086] [0.030] 
Sample Size  9,192  6,383 
Note:  
1)  Also includes controls for marital status, major city, province of residence, age and age 
squared.  
2)  Robust standard errors in square brackets. 
3)  **, * and + denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
4)  See Table 3 notes for definitions of the region of education variables 
Source: generated by the authors based on Statistics Canada, 2006 Canadian Census: 20 Percent 
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Place of Study                
Canada 0.0804**  -0.0566**  -0.0172**  -0.0065 0.183**  -0.0762**  -0.0380**  -0.0688** 
 [0.0169]  [0.0116]  [0.00287]  [0.0118]  [0.0267] [0.0242] [0.00822]  [0.00764] 
UK/Ire./Aus./NZ -0.0214  0.0212  -0.0123**  0.0126 0.104 -0.0288 -0.0202  -0.0547** 
 [0.0372]  [0.0300]  [0.00356]  [0.0207]  [0.0632]  [0.0550]  [0.0244]  [0.0109] 
Western Europe  -0.0282  -0.00658  0.00408  0.0307 0.0477 -0.00774 -0.0135 -0.0265 
 [0.0385]  [0.0185]  [0.00880]  [0.0327]  [0.0755]  [0.0497]  [0.0344]  [0.0296] 
Eastern Europe  -0.0958  0.00471  0.0555  0.0355  -0.519+  0.0577  0.493  -0.0318 
 [0.0592]  [0.0414]  [0.0341]  [0.0366] [0.289]  [0.161]  [0.460]  [0.0366] 
Africa -0.00677  -0.0244  0.0108  0.0204  0.0688  0.0225  -0.0447**  -0.0465** 
 [0.0506]  [0.0257]  [0.0215]  [0.0383]  [0.0976]  [0.0953]  [0.00725]  [0.0172] 
Western Asia  -0.00762  -0.0207  0.0158  0.0125  0.0345  -0.0287  -0.0448**  0.0390 
 [0.0400]  [0.0298]  [0.0186]  [0.0226]  [0.0948]  [0.0630]  [0.00726]  [0.0744] 
South Asia  0.00340  -0.0345*  0.0190  0.0121  0.0762+  -0.0541*  -0.00441  -0.0176 
 [0.0275]  [0.0147]  [0.0139]  [0.0202]  [0.0428]  [0.0275]  [0.0258]  [0.0215] 
East Asia  -0.131**  0.0179  0.0592*  0.0539  -0.346**  0.0860  0.246**  0.0140 
 [0.0450]  [0.0231]  [0.0245]  [0.0356]  [0.0757]  [0.0549]  [0.0794]  [0.0266] 
Developed Asia  -0.00659  -0.0267  0.0175  0.0158  -0.163  0.0251  0.182  -0.0441** 
 [0.0440]  [0.0269]  [0.0280]  [0.0264] [0.139]  [0.0840]  [0.148]  [0.0166] 
South America  -0.106**  -0.00831  0.0962**  0.0177  -0.372**  0.173+  0.152*  0.0477 
 [0.0397]  [0.0203]  [0.0319]  [0.0200]  [0.0976]  [0.0920]  [0.0751]  [0.0413] 
Caribbean -0.190**  0.00903  0.0472+  0.134*  -0.323**  0.0495  0.178+  0.0955 
 [0.0640]  [0.0283]  [0.0242]  [0.0590]  [0.118]  [0.0760]  [0.0932]  [0.0790] 
Place of Birth                 
Non–Eng./Europe -0.0160  0.00421  0.00101  0.0108  0.0558  -0.0153  -0.0462**  0.00574 
 [0.0306]  [0.0231]  [0.00970]  [0.0178]  [0.0758] [0.0513] [0.00967] [0.0559] 
Other -0.00472  0.0137  0.00189  -0.0108  -0.00835  -0.00745  -0.0172  0.0330 
 [0.0245]  [0.0202]  [0.0107]  [0.00749]  [0.0773]  [0.0527]  [0.0164]  [0.0596] 
Immigrant -0.0553  0.0184  0.0155  0.0214  -0.00540  -0.0309  0.0316  0.00468 
 [0.0381]  [0.0267]  [0.0175]  [0.0202]  [0.0790]  [0.0530]  [0.0323]  [0.0499] 
Permanent Resident  -0.0564*  0.0494*  0.000523  0.00650  -0.173**  0.0847+  0.0391  0.0493 
 [0.0260]  [0.0236]  [0.00520]  [0.0117]  [0.0566]  [0.0498]  [0.0271]  [0.0349] 
Temporary Resident  -0.149*  0.109*  0.0183  0.0220  -0.187  0.167  -0.00237  0.0222 
 [0.0652]  [0.0545]  [0.0284]  [0.0335] [0.139]  [0.130]  [0.0308] [0.0695] 
Arrived as child  -0.0812*  0.0320  0.0150  0.0342  -0.0358  0.0432  0.0105  -0.0180 
 [0.0407]  [0.0308]  [0.0166]  [0.0238]  [0.0703]  [0.0629]  [0.0310]  [0.0256] 
Arrived 1997-03  -0.0286  -0.0503**  0.0716  0.00735  -0.128  -0.00526  -0.00128  0.135 
 [0.0703]  [0.0178]  [0.0568]  [0.0330]  [0.149]  [0.0675]  [0.0332]  [0.138] 
Arrived 1994-96  0.0244  -0.0441*  0.0181  0.00162  -0.115  0.0766  0.00986  0.0282 
 [0.0372]  [0.0172]  [0.0196]  [0.0265]  [0.0868]  [0.0741]  [0.0364]  [0.0536] 
Arrived 1987-93  -0.0399  0.0253  0.0196  -0.00497  -0.0763  0.0109  0.0326  0.0328 
 [0.0317]  [0.0272]  [0.0128]  [0.0122]  [0.0629]  [0.0451]  [0.0300]  [0.0387] 
Arrived 1975-79  0.0284  -0.00524  -0.0109**  -0.0122* 0.102**  -0.0387  -0.0211+ -0.0426** 
 [0.0239]  [0.0229]  [0.00262]  [0.00575]  [0.0358] [0.0308] [0.0116] [0.0133] 
Arrived 1970-74  0.0381  -0.00578  -0.0133**  -0.0191** 0.0851+  -0.0195  -0.0224+ -0.0431** 
  49     [0.0238]  [0.0233]  [0.00251]  [0.00357]  [0.0449] [0.0388] [0.0122] [0.0140] 
Arrived 1965-69  0.0740**  -0.0427**  -0.0140**  -0.0173** 0.175**  -0.0911** -0.0410** -0.0434** 
 [0.0149]  [0.0139]  [0.00244]  [0.00389]  [0.0213] [0.0150] [0.00713] [0.0126] 
Arrived 1960-64  0.0342  -0.0113  -0.00761  -0.0153** 0.159**  -0.0829**  -0.0308* -0.0453** 
 [0.0239]  [0.0224]  [0.00494]  [0.00527]  [0.0292] [0.0197] [0.0130] [0.0130] 
Arrived before 1960  0.0295  -9.23e-05  -0.0145**  -0.0149**  0.109+  -0.0496  -0.0308*  -0.0291 
 [0.0429]  [0.0433]  [0.00241]  [0.00505]  [0.0574] [0.0452] [0.0145] [0.0262] 
Sample Size  6,719  2,417 
 
Note:  
1)  Also includes controls for marital status, major city, region, age and age squared.  
2)  Robust standard errors in square brackets. 
3)  ** denotes significance at 1 percent level, * denotes significance at 5 percent level and + 
denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
4)  See Table 4 notes for definitions of the region of education variables 
 








Authors’ calculations based on full country controls model estimates of Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 2: Marginal Probabilities for Country of Study from Occupation Model, Male Medical 




Authors’ calculations based on estimates of Table 7. 
  51    Figure 3: Marginal Probabilities for Country of Study from Occupation Model, Male Medical 
Degree Holders in US 
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